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ABSTRACT: On 26 September 2002, 05 Singapore faced up to its worst economic
year since attaining full political independence in 7965, the Creative Industries
Working Group (ClWG) of the Economic Review Committee (ERC), 0 government-
appointed high-level body tasked with identifying future economic growth sectors
and opportunities for Singapore, unveiled its report entitled Creative Industries
Development Strotegy: Propelling Singapore's Creative Economy (ClWG, 2002).
Among other envisaged outcomes, this policy aims to encourage risk-taking and
entrepreneurship, and attract creative 'talents' to set up shop in Singapore. IWhile
the notion of the 'creative industries' has been modelled after global trends, its
application in a society notorious for its censorious political climate, as welt as its
overt emphases on commercial outcomes, is fraught with problems. This paper offers
a critical examination ofthis new creative industries policy direction spearheaded by
the Singapore government, and considers how, if at all, Singapore may achieve its
prescribed goal of becoming 0 'New Asia Creative Hub' of the 21st century (ClWG,
2002, p. v).
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Introduction
O
n 26 September 2002, as Singapore faced
up to its worst economic performance year
since attaining full political and administrative
independence in 1965, the Creative Industries
Working Croup (CIWC) of the Economic
Review Committee (ERC) unveiled its report
entitled Creative Industries Development Strategy:
Propelling Singapore's Creative Economy (OWC,
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1492002). Having been tasked with identifying future economic growth
sectors and opportunities for Singapore, the government-appointed
high-level committee singled out the development of a 'creative
cluster'-a creative network comprising the arts and cultural sector,
the design sector, and the generic media industry-as a key factor
that would propel Singapore's new innovation-driven economy.
The voguish concept of the 'creative industries', which had been
introduced in· developed countries such as the United Kingdom and
Australia in the latter half of the 1990s, was swiftly adopted by the
Singapore government as a means towards encouraging risk-taking
and entrepreneurship, and attracting creative 'talents' into Singapore.
According to the Creative Industries report, Singapore would become
the 'New Asia Creative Hub' of the 21 st century, which would in turn
ensure its longer-term economic prosperity (CIWG, 2002, p. v).
In order to (re)package the city-state as a creative and vibrant place to
'live, work, and play'-a contemporary catchphrase in Singapore-for
both local and foreign talents, the government initiated several policy
shifts to demonstrate a paradigm shift from being characterised by
an infamously rigid demeanour to displaying a metamorphosing
'liberal' mindset. These changes included the prospective admission
of homosexuals into the civil service; the granting of permits for pubs
and nightclubs to introduce 'bar-top dancing'; the auto-registration of
societies, clubs, and interest groups; and other permissive social and
cultural practices (see Lee, 2004). As these forms of 'Iiberalisations'
were being brought on, there were signs that such 'open' mindsets
exist only on the 'non-political' margins of society. Indeed, the
Singapore government continues to forewarn individuals and groups
to steer clear of controversial political issues (see Lee, 2002a). Such
behaviour is consistent with the ruling People's Action Party's (PAP)
approach to political administration and governance, where strategies
of 'diversion' have been variously applied to depoliticise the citizenry
since it came into power in 19S9 (Leo & Lee, in press). I argue in this
paper that the focus of these 'creative' proposals points to the fact
that the government is seen to be doing 'something', of keeping up
with global trends in the cultural and media industries, rather than the
substance of the initiative(s) put forward.
The paradoxical nature of the notion of 'openness' in Singapore, which
is meant to anticipate a conducive environment for creativity, was well
captured in a speech delivered by Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong to the elite Harvard Club on January 6, 2004-and reprinted in
full by The Straits Times newspaper the next day, presumably for wider
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150national consumption and application. Characterised by the media
as Lee's maiden speech as Prime Minister-Designate, the content was
broadly centred on how Singapore 'must open up further' (Lee, 2004).
As Lee declared:
I have no doubt our society must open up further. The growing
participation and diversity over the two decades have been vital
pluses for Singapore ... Looking ahead, the important task ofthe
Government will be to promote further civic participation, and
continue to widen the limits of openness. (Lee, 2004)
Lee's speech began with an acknowledgment of Singapore's need to
cultivate greater tolerance for diversity in the future, but soon slipped
into an authoritarian mood when he began to reiterate the limits
of such tolerance. A closer reading of his speech points to the fact
that signs of optimism were quickly obfuscated by Lee's reassertion
of the importance of instituting parameters for political debate and
commentary. In Singapore, such parameters are known as out-of-
bounds markers, or 'OB-markers', a golfing analogy well known to avid
golfers (Lee, 2002a, pp. 109-111). Demonstrating the effectiveness of
the PAP government's Realpolitik, Lee cautioned that the OB-markers,
designed to ensure that government authority would not be eroded,
continue to apply in the new 'open' Singapore because the majority of
Singaporeans, euphemistically described as the 'moral majority', 'still
do not play golf' (Lee, 2004).
This paper will begin by examining the rudimentary question of what
constitutes 'creativity' and the necessary socio-cultural factors that are
conducive (or not) to its nurture. It will then consider the question
of whether the industrialisation of creativity is possible in light of
Singapore's censorious political climate, as well as its tendency to focus
chiefly on economic productivity. As I will argue in this paper, these
problems, though not necessarily insurmountable, have the effect of
discouraging or preventing people from challenging prescribed norms,
a requisite process for the development of a truly open and creative
society.
Invoking and innovating creativity
While its definition is often abstruse and cryptic, the concept of
creativity is gaining popularity across governmental bureaucracies and
businesses, as well as within academia. From the domains of cultural
studies and psychology to business administration, researchers have
scrutinised the thought processes of historical great minds, monitored
creativity in living subjects through research experiments, and explored
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and society at large (see, e.g., Florida, 2002; Hesmondhalgh, 2002;
Howkins, 2001; Leo I'< Lee, in press). The various foci of these studies
on creativity have reaped a diverse pool of conceptualisations on the
discourse of creativity. As Flew notes most cogently, in a review essay
on the rise of creativity as a cultural discourse, 'creativity is both big
business and a lot of different things to a lot of different people' (2003,
p. 90). While the discourse of creativity is broad and impossible to
define or expound fully within the scope of this paper, I aim to outline
in this section three pertinent associations of creativity and the creative
environment that have repeatedly emerged in literature dealing with
what appears to be a nebulous concept.
First, creativity is primarily associated with the evocation of new ideas,
solutions, or products that have not previously been explored, and
are relevant to a specific domain. The Oxford Dictionary (1998) defines
creativity as the ability to invent or develop new and original ideas.
Congruent with this, social psychologists Amabile and Tighe (2003,
p. 9), who have conducted extensive research on creativity, point out
that most conceptual acceptances include the key element of novelty
(or originality and 'newness') coupled with 'appropriateness' within
a specific domain. While 'appropriateness' is admittedly subjective
within different contexts, its inclusion serves to highlight that not
every 'original' idea is necessarily 'creative'. Rather, each idea needs
to have a certain level of suitability in a specified field or domain.
Prominent Fulbright Fellow Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi similarly defines
creative people as those who frequently conceive new ideas, decipher
problems, and generate new products, which must be accepted in at
least one cultural setting (cited in Gardner, 1993, p. 32). In short, the
first marker of creativity lies in the originality cum appropriateness of
an idea, solution, or product.
Second, creativity is largely motivated by a passion for the creative
activity, rather than any external stimulator. Amabile calls such passion
'intrinsic motivation', or the ability to engage with a creative activity
due to genuine fervour for the task (1990, pp. 78-79). Intrinsic
motivation is diametrically opposed to extrinsic motivation, which
includes external rewards such as monetary payment, and external
pressures such as deadlines, evaluation stress, surveillance, and limited
alternatives (see Lepper et aI., 1973; Ng, 2001, p. 5). Numerous
studies and experiments over the past decades have shown that those
performing under intrinsic motivation produce far more creative results
than those under extrinsic motivation (Amabile I'< Tighe, 1993, pp. 22-
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extrinsic motivation, Amabile makes clear that one tends to emerge as
the primary driving force in any task, and any task undertaken primarily
with the former tends to be more creative as a result (Amabile, 1990,
p. 78). Veritably, Singaporean psychologist Ng Aik Kwang argues that
the people who tend to be task-involved are more creative than those
who are ego-involved. The former, who perceive themselves to be the
'cause of [their] own behaviour', will experience 'an inner sense of
psychological freedom to create', while the latter will feel like 'a pawn
to the action' as one controlled by extraneous circumstances (Ng,
2001, p. 80). In addition, Csikszentmihalyi observes from his research
that people who are task-involved (or intrinsically motivated) are more
likely to experience 'flow', or the ability to become totally involved
and immersed in one activity. They could also smoothly transit
between different stages of the task, resulting in greater creativity and
productivity (Amabile, 1990, pp. 63-64). In short, a person working
with primary intrinsic motivation would tend to be more creative than
one driven by primarily extrinsic motivation.
Third, creativity requires aspecial kind ofsocial environment and culture
that is sufficiently mature and 'broad-minded' to nourish creativity
amid its possibly subversive manifestations. As creativity at the critical
level entails challenging the status quo so that innovative and inventive
outcomes can be produced, the socio-cultural environment in which
it occurs needs to be accommodative towards non-conformists who
dare to explore beyond established norms. Richard Florida, economics
professor and author of the best-selling book The Rise of the Creative
Class, elaborates on this idea by championing the promotion of
tolerance, in addition to technology and talent-collectively known as
the '3 Ts'-as one of the keys to harnessing creativity (Florida, 2002;
see especially chap. 14). In his book, Florida cites 'bohemianism' and
'homosexuality' as two 'deviant behaviours' that test the tolerance of
a society, and suggests that creatiVity presents itself in intellectuals
who are enriched by such diverse experiences and perspectives.
Singaporean creative-thinking professor and poet Kirpal Singh also
recommends that in order for creativity to flourish, workers should
have the freedom to explore beyond conventional norms and customs,
comfortably leave behind baggage-laden restrictions of the past, and
tread into uncharted grounds to generate new ideas (Singh, 2004, p.
16). In other words, creativity ventures into uncertain territories for
the purpose of challenging workers to discover novel alternatives, and,
as SUCh, is typically found in places open towards social plurality and
cultural diversities.
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material linking the fields of creativity, leadership, and politics, suggests
that 'domain activity, intellectual receptiveness, ethnic diversity, [and]
political openness' are important factors in nurturing creativity (cited
in Florida, 2002, p. 35, emphasis added). While defiance or rebellion
againstestablishments mightnotbe requisites for creativity, asignificant
level of non-conformity and democratically instituted freedom to
explore previously uncharted grounds are certainly useful (Ng, 2001,
p. 54). The implication here is that the lack of political openness, or
the steering of people away from political discussion, is problematic
for the cultivation of creativity on two inter-related levels. On a macro
level, impeding thought processes necessary for-or at least supportive
of-intellectual development and maturity via legal and/or regulatory
means is likely to blunt one's creative edge. On a micro level, setting
and regularly fine-tuning of societal and political rules have the effect
of creating a censorious climate of fear, resulting, at the minimum, in
psychological barriers that prevent people from thinking and 'creating'
revolutionary ideas (Gomez, 2000, p. 68). In other words, an open
society that espouses non-violent political and democratic freedoms of
speech and association is afundamental criterion for the existence and
subsequent promotion of creativity.
Negotiating the economics of creativity
There have been distinct applications of 'creativity' with economic
benefits in mind since the late 1990s, particularly in governmental
policy-making and academic research. Such trends began with Britain's
Creative Industries Mapping Document (UK Creative Taskforce, 1998),
and were further applied by academics, with the overhaul and re-
branding of the former Faculty of Humanities in Australia's Queensland
University of Technology as the Faculty of Creative Industries the most
prominent case in point in the Asia-Pacific region (Flew, 2003, p. 89;
see also Leo & Lee, in press)'. The creative industries, as determined
by Britain's Creative Industries Mapping Document and adopted into
Singapore's own creative industries strategy document, are defined
as:
Those industries which hove their origin in individual creativity,
skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job
creation through the generotion and exploitation of intellectual
property. (Creative Taskforce, 1998, p. 5)
In employing the nascent concept of the creative industries, the
Singaporean government demonstrated its agility in jumping swiftly
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acceptance of what I consider as a 'vogueish' buzzword into the realm
of policy. In effect and essence, the Creative Industries Developmental
Strategy (CIWG, 2002) is an extension of earlier cultural policies aimed
at enlivening the arts and cultural scenes in Singapore. Indeed, the
CIWG Report acknowledges that 'the arts and culture sector is the
artistic core' of what is known as the 'creative cluster' (C1WG, 2002,
p. 10), essentially a concentration of interconnected industries or
institutions that rely on innovation and creativity for growth and
development (Flew, 2002, p. 130). In Singapore, three broad groups
who work in the arts and culture, design, and media industries were
defined as the 'creative cluster' to be developed for the 'propelling of
Singapore's Creative Economy' (CIWG, 2002). The 'creative cluster'
idea is drawn heavily from the work of Florida, who notes that creative
workers have become the decisive source of competitive advantage
in the contemporary economy and society (Florida, 2002, pp. 5-6).
For this reason, businesses seek to situate themselves in places where
'clusters' of creative people reside.
In Singapore's case, the first creative cluster initiative is a minor
revision of the Renaissance City Report, mainly to include 'innovation'
as a key policy outcome within the arts and cultural sector. This was
codenamed 'Renaissance City 2.0' in the CIWG report (2002, chap.
2), which is to be read as version 2.0 of the Renaissance City Report
(originally published by the Ministry of Information &: the Arts [MITA],
2000). Such nomenclature reflects once again Singapore's ability to
keep up with 'cool' management trends and technological buzzwords.
In essence, however, this section is mostly a rehash of old policy
statements pertaining to Singapore's 'Asian Renaissance' vision, in
which every Singaporean is imagined to be civic-minded, 'attuned
to his [sic] Asian roots', and an 'active citizen who is not just a mere
actor in a vast nameless play, but a co-writer of the Singapore Story,
with the latitude and responsibility to input his own distinctive [and
creative] ideas' (MITA, 2000, p. 39). To be sure, the 'Singapore Story',
as defined by Singapore's 'founding father', now Senior Minister, Lee
Kuan Yew, in his highly publicised dual-volume memoirs, is a political/
politicised account of the economic miracle of Singapore fashioned by
Lee himself (Lee, 1998, 2000). Hence, the 'creative' and 'innovative'
Singaporean must be one who vindicates, both figuratively and
literally, the economic and political meanings embedded within the
creative industries discourse.
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a 'Design Singapore initiative', so as to position Singapore as a
global hub of multimedia design capabilities (OWG, 2002, chap. 3;
'Government Has Designs', 2003). Apart from· a general recognition
of the importance of good commercial design, particularly in product
packaging and the (re)branding of Singapore as a high-tech and global
hub city, not much has been articulated about the significance of a
'Design Singapore' initiative under the rubric of the creative industries.
This is due to the fact that the concept of creative and multimedia
design, even within the higher education sector, has had very little
discussion in the public domain. While the government has announced
plans to invest in design education within the tertiary and vocational
institutions (OWG, 2002, pp. 24-25), it remains to be seen whether
the foregrounding of design as a viable economic pursuit will invoke
cultural and 'creative' shifts among Singaporeans.
The third and final 'cluster' initiative, also known as 'Media 21',
'envisions Singapore as a global media city, a thriving media ecosystem
with roots in Singapore, and with strong extensions internationally'
(CIWG, 2002, p. 37)'. The drawing of the 'ecosystem' idea within
'Media 21' is intended to link the Singapore media sector within a
broader creative network that includes the arts and multimedia design
cum digital technologies, as well as media exchange and trading. The
physical manifestation of an ecosystem lies in the 'creation of a media
city to capture public and industry imagination', and to 'underscore
government commitment to develop [the media] sector' (OWG,
2002, p. 39). This media city, which is being constructed at the time
of writing this paper, is referred to as 'Mediapolis@one-north', or
'Fusionpolis', defined as a 'state-of-the-art work, live, play and learn
environment for media and info-communication companies, and the
artistic community' (Singapore Broadcasting Authority [SBAJ, 2002,
p. 7). Official statements and documents claim that the intention
behind this physical 'creative-clustering' of media and media-related
professionals into a single township is to increase economic vibrancy
and to inspire the wider community toward greater creativity and
social vitality (CIWG, 2002, p. 2). Of course, whether this 'media city'
will deliver the projected dividends remains an open question, and
must therefore be the subject of further study at a later time.
As extrapolated from all three clusters-or, more accurately, 'sub-
policies'-the new emphases on 'creativity' in Singapore tend to
approach the so-called 'creative' sectors not so much from cultural
or artistic viewpoints; rather, the approach is almost overwhelmingly
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a consideration of the commercial in policy-making, Singapore's
uptake of the concept is an extraordinary case study in that it
privileges economic returns over all else. Lily Kong, in an earlier
study on cultural policy in Singapore, calls this the 'hegemony of the
economic in Singapore' (Kong, 2000, p. 423). Unlike the emphases
on social, political, intellectual, and emotional developments of the
individual in Florence, Italy, during the 'original' Renaissance period,
the Singaporean Renaissance is designed to industrialise creativity so
that every individual with 'creative potential' can and will become
economically productive. In actuality, the Mediapolis/Fusionpolis
concept is intended to replicate 'cluster centres' such as New York's
'Silicon Alley' and San Francisco's world-renowned 'Silicon Valley', with
the belief that it would be a drawcard to lure creative talents for the
sake of economic prosperity and longevity (Flew, 2002, p. 130).
The primacy of Singapore's economic priorities for the creative
industries is highly problematic. As mentioned earlier, creativity is
predominantly associated with the evocation of new ideas, solutions,
or products that have not previously been explored. The island-state's
virtual absence of natural resources has turned it into a trading port,
with an overt dependency on imported goods for consumption. This
has in part led to the privileging of cultural and creative products from
foreign sources (usually the West) over local. After all, it is economically
more viable to import such products than to produce them 'in-house'
for only four million people (Chang & Lee, 2003, p. 137). The corollary
is that such economic rationales lead to decreased 'creativity', with
local or indigenous cultural workers robbed of their physical and
metaphysical 'creative spaces' to explore and nurture their crafts.
As a classic example, the building of the SS600million rnammoth
Esplanade: Theatres By The Bay-opened amid a multi-million-dollar
fanfare in October 2002-was regarded by local arts practitioners
and critics as a dual economic-cum-tourism strategy to attract world-
class acts to perform in Singapore, as only such 'surefire successes',
as measured by box-office takings, would be able to afford the space
(Kong, 2000, p. 419). Local artforms were thus deemed unimportant,
or at least secondary, to their foreign counterparts. Yet, a professed
'creative' city would be truly creative only if local artforms were
developed, instead of standing merely as an empty shell through
which global acts' transit. While the state currently attempts to nurture
its 'creative industries', its inherent bias towards foreign artforms, as a
result of its focus on immediate economic returns, makes the notion
The economics and politics of 'creativity' in Singaporeof creativity as the harnessing of new ideas, solutions, or products
untenable in Singapore.
In addition, the economic pragmatism that has been drilled into
the Singaporean mindset hinders the development of creativity by
setting externalised and overwhelmingly economic inducements as
motivations, rather than encouraging a more 'humanistic' approach to
the sector (Chang &: Lee, 2003, p. 133). As discussed earlier, a creative
society can be nurtured only if people are intrinsically motivated in
creative tasks (Amabile, 1993, pp. 22-23). In acountrywhere 'economic
growth is the anchor without which all issues become irrelevant' (Birch,
1993, p. 4), the meanings behind nurturing a creative, enlightened,
and appreciative society have been rendered secondary to maintaining
the economic bottom line. In the context of Singapore's struggle to
embrace the creative industries, I would suggest that creativity of the
inventive and innovative sorts could flourish only if the 'cultural horse'
is placed before the 'economic cart'. In other words, in pursuing
one's creative passion(s), it is vital to ensure that the social, cultural,
intellectual, and, indeed, political aspects are openly explored well
before economic motivators are considered (see Kong, 2000; Leo &:
Lee, in press). While it is true that the arts and creative industries can
benefit the economic gross domestic product (GDP) in no small terms,
the 'capacity to unleash social and cultural vibrancy can be easily
shackled by an uncompromising focus on the commercial' (Tan, 2003,
p. 418). The mindsets of the authorities, as well as the people, must be
altered before creativity and innovation can emerge.
Negotiating the politics of creativity
Since Singapore's full independence in 1965, the PAP government's
legitimacy has been largely founded on its economic management
and performance. At the same time, its perpetual endorsement and
promotion of economic pragmatism has effectively re-routed the
attentions of Singaporeans away from political issues (Leo &: Lee,
in press). While the government is loath to adrnit it, this strategic
'depoliticisation' of the citizenry is problematic to the cultivation
of creativity, insofar as the notion of 'creativity' is representative of
the openness of a culture and its polity. As posited earlier, creativity
requires a social environrnent that is 'tolerant' enough to cultivate new
ideas, even in their possibly politically subversive manifestations (see
Florida, 2002). Singapore's reputation as a 'no-nonsense' authoritarian
regime, with its political leaders ultra-sensitive to political criticisms
and its citizens highly subservient and docile (Mauzy &: Milne, 2002),
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makes the discourse of creativity somewhat incompatible, even futile.
After all, creativity requires not passive and mechanical workers, but
thinkers who constantly challenge the status quo so that originality and
innovation can be promulgated. Rather than make substantial changes
at the ideological level, the government has sagaciously opted to make
strategic allowances to demonstrate to the world that Singapore is
'opening-up'.
While making concessions such as granting permits for extreme
sports such as reverse-bungee-jumping and sky-diving, the auto-
registration of societies and civic/interest groups, and the relaxation
of rules governing bar-top dancing and other night-time activities,
the government continues to enforce the existence of OB-markers
and other state-defined conditions (Lee, 2002a, p. 110). As I have
argued elsewhere (Lee, 2002a), such concessions entail the politically
'creative' practice of 'gestural politics', where on one hand the
government seems to accommodate greater socio-cultural plurality,
but on the other it suppresses the emergence and development of an
independent civil society. These 'gesturaI' concessions are intended to
further 'depoliticise' the citizenry by appearing to increase the vivacity
of a society without running any risk of the ruling party's authority
being challenged or undermined. The focus shifts to the fact that
the government is 'doing something', rather than the substance of
the initiative implemented. Thus, such widely publicised measures
to 'liberalise' Singapore do not possess much practical or political
significance. They are, in other words, purely gestural (Lee, 2002a, p.
111 ).
The government's defence of its sluggish rate of liberalisation has
often been its reinforcement of 'Asian values' (Tan, 2003, p. 408). The
concept of 'Asian values' has been invoked, especially in the 1990s,
to 'counteract the disruptive individualism of western liberalism' in
Singapore (Hill, 2000, p. 178). To legitimise the continued succession
of the government's power, the discourse of Asian values has become
a useful political tool to avert excessively 'democratic' or 'liberal'
behaviour by advocating deference for authority (Chua, 1995, pp.
22-23). Prior to the advent of the creative industries project, the
government had vehemently rejected the moral and cultural values
of the 'decadent West', particularly with regard to homosexuality.
However, in July 2003, despite the fact that homosexuality remains a
criminal offence in Singapore under the Penal Code ('Singapore Does
Some Soul Searching', 2003), Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong made a
peculiar declaration that the Singapore government was prepared to
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see also Elegant, 2003). Lest one gets too caught up with governmental
'spin', this seemingly liberal statement needs to be tempered with the
authority's continual refusal to grant Singapore's most prominent gay-
rights group 'People Like Us' a legitimate and licensed existence (see
'Gay Group Fails', 2004), using the convenient Asian conservatism
argument as a justification for its austerity.
It is debatable whether the majority of Singaporeans are truly 'Asian'
or strictly 'conservative' or if the myth of a 'moral majority' is simply
'politically useful fiction' (Tan, 2003, p. 410). The PAP has historically
associated homosexuality with Western 'baser instincts', and the
resistance towards such behaviour indicates an unrelenting move to
insulate Singapore against any subversive conduct that might threaten
the government's authority and electoral standing. However, in buying
into Florida's (2002) assertion that creative people are mostly found
in places that are tolerant, diverse, and accepting of gay lifestyles,
Singapore has sought to pre-emptively assuage fears by creative
workers that they would be taken to task for their 'bohemianism' or
alternative lifestyles (see 'What's So Subversive about People Like Us?',
2004). The unwritten message here is that 'deviance' is an acceptable
component of creativity only if workers remain apolitical and economic
productiveness is not compromised.
In addition to 'Asian values', the combined invocation of the OB-
markers and other juridical actions remain .potent in ensuring the
political docility of the population. Through ideological reasoning of
communitarianism and deference to authority, the PAP moralises the
'Asian' cause of self-reduction in the name of a collective 'national
interest', to ensure the depoliticisation of the citizenry (Chua, 1995).
Additionally, the PAP summons the use of OB-markers to publicly
rebuke political transgressors or 'trouble-makers', a tactic that is
highly effective in a society where 'face' is of utmost importance. First
coined by Prime Minister Goh when the government issued a caustic
rejoinder to a bold article written by Catherine Lim in 1994 on the
'great affective divide' between the PAP and the people (Lim, 1994, p.
12; see also Lee, 2002b; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 141), OB-markers
were evoked as recently as 2003 to rebuke two Nanyang Technological
University professors who challenged the government on foreign talent
and employment figures (see Fernandez, 2004, p. 12). In refusing to
define the limits of OB-markers, the government uses them in a 'catch-
all' manner, often retrospectively, thus achieving a sophisticated mode
of 'auto-regulation' to enforce mass subjugation and discipline (Lee,
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a culture for people to err on the 'safe side' of the 'non-political'. In
addition, draconian legislation such as the Internal Security Act (ISA)
and applicable defamation laws have allowed the government to
'restrict individual liberties and impede rnass political organisation'
through harsh punishments that are meant to deter others (Mauzy &;
Milne, 2002, p. 128).
These laws, codes, and rules-whether written or unwritten, real or
imagined-combine to create a climate of fear and excessive caution
in Singapore, resulting in the enactment of psychological barriers that
prevent people from 'pushing the limits' for fear of being incarcerated
or 'blacklisted'. Singaporeans are thus dis-incentivised from 'thinking
outside the box', a common element of creativity, preferring instead to
remain in secure boundaries. Even if a creative individual has no wish
to rebel against the political establishment, the ability to freely explore
uncharted territories is often inhibited. Indeed, I would contend that
according socio-political space for an individual to think, speak, and act
is indispensable to the creative process.
Despite Singapore's professed desire to become a 'global media city',
as envisioned by the Media 27 statement (SBA, 2002), PAP leaders
have repeatedly echoed Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew's credo that the
primary purpose of the media is to be the government's mouthpiece
and thereby assist in nation-building (Birch, 1993; Leo &; Lee, in press).
This means that the Western model of the press as the fourth estate
and the media as society's watchdog is frowned upon in Singapore
(George, 2002). Even as the key deliverables of the Creative Industries
strategy, such as the Fusionpolis/Mediapolis structure as the epitome
of a 'global media city', start to unfold, there are signs that the
forthcoming PAP administration under the premiership of Lee Hsien
Loong will maintain 'tried and tested' media policies of containment.
As Lee has declared in his 'open-up' Singapore speech:
The [Singapore] media should report news accurately and fairly,
in order to inform and educate the public. It should adopt a
national perspective on issues, educating Singaporeans on the
reality of global competition, or the need for healthy habits
during the SARS outbreak. But it should avoid crusading
journalism, slanting news coverage to campaign for personal
agendas. This way, the media helps the public to decide and
judge issues for themselves, and provide a valuable channel for
them to voice news and opinions. (Lee, 2004) .
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population, yet it contradicts the government-mandated nationalistic
role of the media. It is clear that the absence of 'crusading journalism'
and 'slanting news coverage' in the media works well to indirectly
control the number of alternative ideologies circulating in Singapore
(Lee 2002b, p. 10). Yet in the context of the creative industries, a
socio-cultural and political environment that is open to diversities,
alternatives, and the tolerance of differences does not appear to
be optional. The unwillingness of the authorities to loosen their
monopolistic grip on power suggests that Singapore is poised for a
rough journey as it strides towards realising its ambitious 'New Asia
Creative Hub' vision (CIWG, 2002, p. v).
Conclusion
On 19 July 1999, Time magazine fronted its issue of the week with the
heading: 'Singapore Swings: Can Nanny State Give Up Its Authoritarian
Ways?'. The lead story in the globally distributed current affairs
magazine, entitled 'Singapore Lightens Up', attempted to answer the
opening question by declaring: 'Nanny state? Hardly. Once notorious
for tight government control, the city-state is getting competitive,
creative, even funky' (McCarthy I'< Ellis, 1999, p. 17). Since then,
there have been several overt attempts to enliven the creative climate
in Singapore, described by Kenneth Paul Tan (2003) as an attempt at
'sexing up Singapore' for the sake of the new economy. While these
changes are a positive step towards liberalising Singapore, this paper
has argued that most of the modifications have been but cosmetic
and inconsequential-or in a word, gestural (Lee, 2002a). The
government's obdurate insistence on economic outcomes continues
to limit the development of creativity. In addition, its reluctance to
embrace political openness hinders wider possibilities vis-a-vis the
cultivation of creativity (Florida, 2002).
In conclusion, I postulate that, under the present political climate,
Singapore's Creative Industries strategy cum policy is likely to evolve
into a unique Singapore-branded 'equilibrium', one that is loosely
creative at the 'margins' but bears the marks of political conformity
and economic pragmatism in the main (Florida, 2002, p. 249-250;
Leo I'< Lee, in press). While the industrialisation of creativity, along
with cognate fields and industries, is to be expected in a developed
economic set-up, Singapore as a culture, society, and polity needs to
move beyond token gesturaI changes. The (re)packaging of Singapore
as a creative, 'cool', and 'funky' place to live needs to coincide with
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possibilitLes, AsfQrmer high-profiled Singaporean journalist Cherian
George (2000, p. 207) puts it, unless 'centralised control' is prepared
to 'give way to individual autonomy, steep hierarchy to flat structure,
and standardisation to diversity [of thought and opinion], it will
be difficult, if not impossible, for Singapore to realise its 'New Asia
Creative Hub' ambition.
Notes
1. For more information about the Creative Industries Faculty
at Australia's Queensland University of Technology, go to
http://www.creativeindustries.qut.com.ltis also worth noting
that several other institutions around the world have since adopted
the 'Creative Industries' rubric in their faculty or departmental
naming.
2. The 'Media 21' blueprint was first released by the Singapore
Broadcasting Authority (SBA) in early 2002. Formed by a three-way
merger of the Films and Publications Department, Singapore Film
Commission, and the SBA in January 2003, the Media Development
Authority (MDA) has since taken over the management of the 'Media
21' vision. For more information on the roles and functions of the
MDA, visit http://www.mda.gov.sg.
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